1 Introduction

On July 23, 2020, an individual named Mr. Alston, residing in the United Kingdom, chose to register the domain name <alstomarketing.com>. For five years, this domain name remained inactive, with the sole exception of a “Coming Soon” page that appears to have been displayed briefly in August 2022. Mr. Alston allegedly intended to create his own marketing agency. However, rather than selecting a combination incorporating his patronymic, one may think in particular of the domain name <alston.marketing>, which has always been available, he opted instead for <alstomarketing.com>[1]. That domain name reproduces the trademark ALSTOM, which is strictly associated with the activities of the eponymous company in the field of international rail mobility, a company with a substantial presence across all continents[2].

In March 2025, Alstom initiated an extrajudicial proceeding[3] under the auspices of the World Intellectual Property Organization Arbitration and Mediation Center (hereinafter, “WIPO”) seeking the transfer of the domain name <alstomarketing.com>.

In its UDRP decision D2025‑0949, Alstom v. Farris Alston, dated April 22, 2025[4], the panelist rejected Alstom’s request for transfer on grounds that are, at best, unpersuasive. Beyond the outcome itself, the decision invites closer scrutiny on several interconnected issues: the evidentiary requirements for establishing trademark notoriety (1); the probative function of notoriety in UDRP proceedings (2); the assessment of the respondent’s alleged rights or legitimate interests (3); and, more unusually, the panel’s own evidentiary initiative, taken outside the adversarial framework, to compensate for the respondent’s lack of proof (4).

2 ALSTOM, a Well-Known Trademark

At the heart of the decision lies the question of the well-known character of the ALSTOM trademark and the implications of such recognition within the framework of a UDRP or equivalent proceeding[5]. In order to provide clarity on this issue, we will first recall the legal framework applicable to well-known trademarks (2.1), then examine their probative effect in UDRP proceedings (2.2)[6]. We will then consider how such notoriety is established in practice, with particular attention to the ALSTOM trademark (2.3), before analysing how the decision at hand addressed the request for recognition of notoriety (2.4).

2.1 The Legal Framework of Well-Known Trademarks

A well-known trademark is defined as a mark that is widely recognized by the relevant public as identifying the goods or services of its owner, even in the absence of registration, as a result of intensive, continuous, and public use conferring upon it distinctiveness and independent economic value. The concept of a well-known trademark is longstanding and firmly rooted in international legal instruments. Thus, Article 6bis of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property[7] requires the States party thereto to refuse or cancel the registration of, and to prohibit the use of, a trademark that constitutes a reproduction, imitation, or translation of a well-known trademark, even where the latter is not registered in the country concerned[8].

In practice, recognition of a trademark’s well-known character is most often confirmed by national intellectual property offices or by competent state courts, both relying on a body of indicia provided by the trademark owner. Panels, in the context of extrajudicial domain name dispute resolution proceedings, are likewise not reluctant to rule on whether a trademark is well known on the basis of the evidence submitted by the party invoking such notoriety. On the contrary, this assessment forms an integral part of their mandate and is frequently encountered in UDRP decisions.

2.2 The Probative Function of Well-Known Trademarks under the UDRP

Within the framework of the UDRP, notoriety is addressed in a functional manner. The UDRP does not establish an autonomous regime for “well-known trademarks” or “reputed trademarks” as understood in domestic legal systems. Panels adjudicating such disputes do not always employ the adjective “well-known” and may instead resort to alternative expressions such as “famous trademark,” “well-known mark,” or “widely recognized trademark”[9].

Contrary to a sometimes-held assumption, the outcome of a UDRP proceeding does not hinge on notoriety as such. The WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Selected UDRP Questions[10] merely indicates that a trademark widely known to the public may facilitate proof of two essential elements: first, identity or confusing similarity with the trademark[11]; and second, the respondent’s actual or presumed knowledge of the trademark at the time of registration of the disputed domain name[12]. In other words, under the UDRP, notoriety serves a probative function: it is not an end in itself, but a means of establishing that the respondent could not have been unaware of the trademark at the time of registration of the disputed domain name, which in turn supports the absence of rights or legitimate interests and the finding of bad faith at the time of registration.

This logic is consistent with the legal reasoning underlying the UDRP. Indeed, it is in the analysis of the third element (registration and use in bad faith) that notoriety plays a central role, as it allows panels to presume that the respondent deliberately selected the trademark in question with full knowledge of its existence, and therefore with a speculative, parasitic, or dilatory intent. It is precisely for this reason that, in UDRP proceedings, complainants who consider the argument relevant and well founded request that the panel adjudicating the dispute formally recognize the well-known character of their trademark.

2.3 Evidence of Notoriety

To situate this discussion within the domain of evidence, we will begin by recalling the rule derived from the principle actori incumbit probatio (2.3.1), then outline evidentiary methods appropriate to B2B/B2G trademarks (2.3.2). We will illustrate these points with the case of ALSTOM (2.3.3) and a brief overview of relevant UDRP decisions (2.3.4), before examining how the request for recognition of notoriety was addressed in the decision under commentary (2.4).

2.3.1 The Principle: Actori incumbit probatio

Under the UDRP, the complainant bears the burden of proof, according to the standard of the balance of probabilities. The complainant must demonstrate: (i) the existence of trademark rights; (ii) where applicable, the well-known character of that trademark; (iii) the identity or confusing similarity between the mark and the disputed domain name; (iv) the respondent’s lack of rights or legitimate interests; (v) the bad faith registration of the domain name; and (vi) its bad faith use.

Evidence of notoriety (and, more broadly, of each of these elements) must be based on objective, dated, and verifiable materials: ownership certificates, administrative or judicial decisions, reputable publications, internal reports and documents corroborated by other elements. The temporal relevance of the exhibits (i.e., prior to or contemporaneous with the domain name registration) and their geographical relevance (i.e., probative value within the respondent’s jurisdiction or the targeted user base) must also be assessed. Assertions not supported by admissible evidence carry little or no weight.

The panel has the authority, where necessary, to conduct factual verifications ex officio, without, however, substituting itself for the parties in the administration of evidence. That said, this discretionary power has procedural implications. Indeed, where such verifications may influence the outcome of the dispute, the principle of adversarial proceedings requires that the results be communicated to the parties, so that each may respond meaningfully within an appropriate timeframe.

2.3.2 Evidence of Notoriety for a B2B or B2G Trademark

Establishing notoriety may prove more complex for trademarks operating exclusively in a B2B environment[13], or even B2G[14], than for those aimed at the general public (B2C). A company such as Alstom, whose business primarily consists in supplying transport equipment and services to railway operators or public authorities, does not operate in the same sphere as a retail brand or a consumer goods trademark. In the B2C context[15], notoriety can be readily assessed through mass dissemination, opinion surveys, or pervasive advertising campaigns. By contrast, for B2B/B2G companies (such as Alstom), recognition requires more technical indicators: the value and scale of contracts awarded, sectoral recognition through professional awards, specialised media coverage, geographical reach, or prior judicial decisions.

Accordingly, in the UDRP context, demonstrating the notoriety of such a trademark calls for an adapted evidentiary approach, based on indicators that may be less visible to the general public but are nonetheless equally significant in establishing the brand’s importance and reputation within its sector.

In practice, it is customary to rely on a combination of evidence, including the following:

It is useful to clarify that it is not necessary to produce exhaustive documentation. In UDRP proceedings, a limited number of relevant and properly documented indicators are sufficient to establish that a mark is “well known to the general public” or “well established in its sector”, within the meaning of sections 1.3 and 3.1 of the WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Selected UDRP Questions[16]. That said, certain procedural constraints must be borne in mind. As the procedure is designed to be expeditious, written submissions are strictly regulated. First, Article 3(b) of the UDRP Rules requires that the complaint set out the grounds “limited to what is necessary to establish its merits”[17], which necessarily calls for concision. Second, at least in proceedings administered by WIPO, Article 12 of the Supplemental Rules imposes strict word limits[18]. While the number of annexes is not formally capped, these constraints in practice restrict the ability to submit as many supporting documents as a party might wish. As a result, the complainant must, on the one hand, make a reasoned and hierarchical selection of exhibits and, on the other hand, present clear, dated, and verifiable evidence, while complying with the inherent brevity requirements of the procedure.

2.3.3 The notoriety of the ALSTOM mark

Pursuant to Article 2 of the UDRP Policy, by applying to register a domain name, the registrant represents and warrants, inter alia, that to the best of its knowledge such registration does not infringe the rights of any third party and is not undertaken for any unlawful purpose. We have long argued that these representations imply a duty of diligence, materialised through reasonable prior checks, at a minimum basic online searches and trademark database searches, in order to avoid infringing earlier rights.

In the present case, elementary searches on the main search engines, irrespective of geographic settings, and in any event from within the United Kingdom, yield exclusively results relating to the ALSTOM group (corporate website, subsidiaries, press releases, media coverage, etc.). This is hardly surprising, given that Alstom has been firmly established in the United Kingdom for many years, with major sites in Derby and Plymouth, as well as a network of approximately 30 maintenance depots across the country[19]. This presence is also reflected in flagship contracts which, given the amounts involved (often public funds), receive significant media coverage[20]. As a result, there are hundreds of references to the ALSTOM brand in the British general and business press. By way of indication, the Financial Times website records more than one thousand occurrences[21], while The Times lists nearly five hundred[22]. The UK government portal shows a comparable volume of references[23]. Moreover, the same demonstration could be made for a multitude of countries, including the United States, which happens to be the country of the sole panelist[24].

If that were not sufficient, consultation of official trademark databases immediately reveals a very large number of active “ALSTOM” trademarks worldwide. By way of illustration, a search for “ALSTOM” in the WIPO Global Brand Database returns more than 700 active trademark registrations held by the group’s parent company, covering a substantial number of jurisdictions worldwide, including no fewer than 44 trademarks registered in the United Kingdom (UKIPO), once again the country of the respondent[25] (see the map above).

Taken together, these elements, in and of themselves, strongly support the recognition of the well‑known character of the ALSTOM mark.

2.3.4 The notoriety of the ALSTOM mark in UDRP decisions

We conducted a study of the 174 UDRP decisions issued prior to the decision under comment that involved the ALSTOM mark. Of this total, 134 decisions (77.00%) expressly recognised, on the basis of the arguments and evidence submitted, the well‑known character of the mark and drew the necessary consequences therefrom: the respondents, being unable to have been unaware of its existence, were found to have acted in bad faith. In 34 cases (19.5%), the complainant had indeed invoked the notoriety of the ALSTOM mark, but the issue was sidestepped by the panel, which is striking. In 5 decisions (2.9%), notoriety was implicitly accepted, without any developed analysis. One case (0.6%) presented exceptional circumstances justifying that the issue be left aside[26].

The statistical analysis of UDRP decisions issued prior to the UDRP Decision D2025-0949 concerning the domain name <alstomarketing.com> also provides an opportunity to assess the success rate of complaints filed by ALSTOM. The Complainant prevailed in 173 out of the 174 recorded proceedings. Only one case deviated from this trend[27].

In summary, in the overwhelming majority of cases involving the ALSTOM trademark, its notoriety is recognized, the respondents’ bad faith is established, and the transfer of the domain name(s) is ordered. In other words, the decision under review is surprising and deserves attention. Three lessons emerge from this. First, it is essential to rigorously substantiate the trademark’s notoriety in the complaint: panelists are required to rule on well-supported arguments presented to them—not only is this the very nature of their role, it is also a duty arising from the acceptance of their appointment. Second, although every case retains its own specificity, when facing a trademark with such a reputation, the burden of explanation borne by the respondent becomes considerably more complex[28]. Third, dismissing or downplaying the notoriety of ALSTOM appears to be an exception that must be carefully justified. Yet, in the decision under review, such justification is virtually absent.

2.4 Addressing the Request for Recognition of Notoriety

We shall first outline the framework within which the panel exercises its freedom (and duty) with respect to the assessment of facts and evidence and the reasoning of the decision (2.4.1). We will then focus on the sparsely reasoned refusal to acknowledge the notoriety of the ALSTOM trademark (2.4.2). Finally, we will draw conclusions regarding the burden of proof (2.4.3).

2.4.1 A Panel’s Duty

The panel enjoys undeniable discretion in conducting the procedure and assessing the evidence submitted by the parties. Article 15 of the UDRP Rules provides that the decision must be rendered based notably on the statements and documents submitted by the parties[29]. This discretionary power is accompanied by a duty of diligence, which consists in examining all claims reasonably raised by the parties and in providing sufficiently reasoned decisions.

Among these claims, the request to recognize the notoriety of a trademark holds particular importance, as it is a key factor in determining the respondent’s good or bad faith. Indeed, presumed knowledge of a well-known mark directly impacts the assessment of the respondent’s conduct under Article 4(a)(iii) of the UDRP Policy[30].

Accordingly, the panel is under an obligation to rule explicitly on the alleged notoriety. This requirement stems, on the one hand, from Article 10(b) of the UDRP Rules, which mandates that parties be treated fairly[31], and on the other hand, from Article 15(a), which—as previously mentioned—requires the panel to decide on the basis of the parties’ submissions and evidence[32]. Failing to respond to such a request would deprive the complainant of the opportunity to rely on a piece of evidence that is not ancillary, but central to establishing the respondent’s bad faith and, consequently, to determining the outcome of the dispute[33].

2.4.2 The Enigmatic Rejection of the Request for Recognition of the ALSTOM Trademark’s Notoriety

In the present case, the panel did indeed rule on whether or not the ALSTOM trademark was well known. But it erred in doing so. Certainly, as we are external observers, we do not have access to the full details of the evidence submitted by the Complainant to demonstrate the notoriety of its trademark. However, should the decision itself not enable the parties to understand the panel’s reasoning and factual basis? In this case, the treatment of the notoriety analysis is strikingly brief. Indeed, the decision merely asserts that the Complainant submitted “little evidence showing that the ALSTOM trademark is well known”[34], without detailing the nature of the documents submitted or the evaluative criteria applied. This lack of reasoning makes it impossible to understand why the submitted materials were deemed insufficient. Moreover, such a shortcoming undermines the predictability that parties are entitled to expect. In short, the impression left is one of arbitrariness, for lack of arbitration worthy of the name.

Finally, the phrase “little evidence” warrants further comment. The Respondent, as will be noted later, submitted no evidence whatsoever—nothing at all. Therefore, even if the Complainant’s materials to support its claim of notoriety were considered insufficient, they cannot be equated with a complete lack of evidence. There is thus an asymmetry. And this asymmetry, which is not addressed in the reasoning, contributes to a sense that the decision was rendered in a cursory or even unbalanced manner—something that may again weaken the trust that UDRP stakeholders are entitled to expect.

2.4.3 The Consequences of This Rejection

Under UDRP jurisprudence, recognition of a trademark’s notoriety gives rise to a near-irrefutable presumption that the respondent was aware of it at the time of registration. In parallel, this presumption raises the standard for the respondent’s explanation under Article 4(c) of the UDRP Policy[35]. At the same time, it lowers the threshold for reasoning based on the Telstra line of cases[36] in situations involving passive holding—which was the case here. As Telstra reminds us, “inactivity” is not a neutral factor: panelists assess the totality of the circumstances to infer bad faith, particularly (i) the strength and notoriety of the complainant’s trademark; (ii) the absence of active use of the domain name coupled with the lack of any credible explanation from the respondent for a good faith use; (iii) the provision of false contact details or anonymization to avoid identification; (iv) the respondent’s failure to respond or provide evidence; and (v) the implausibility of any good faith use of the domain name given the targeted trademark. The more these factors converge, the more passive holding tends to support a finding of bad faith under Article 4(a)(iii) of the UDRP Policy. In practice, recognized notoriety makes it significantly harder for a respondent to rely on the argument of mere coincidence.

However, notoriety alone does not always suffice to prove that the respondent registered the disputed domain name with the Complainant’s trademark in mind. In the absence of corroborating elements—such as exploitation of misleading traffic, deceptive semantic construction, an offer to sell the domain name—and if, conversely, the respondent’s narrative is supported by dated and verifiable documentation, the panel may still find no bad faith. The case Gordon Sumner p/k/a Sting v. Michael Urvan concerning the domain name <sting.com> offers a rare illustration. The panel rejected the complaint, notably finding that no evidence showed the respondent was targeting the famous artist’s trademark[37].

Conversely, when notoriety is not established, the presumption of knowledge weakens. Absent consistent indicia, a credible explanation from the respondent may suffice, provided it is supported by objective documentation. In this case—though this may seem surprising—the ALSTOM trademark was not recognized as well known, and the respondent’s narrative, based on the surname “Alston,” was deemed plausible despite a total lack of documentation. As we shall see, this narrative, lacking any verifiable foundation, is ultimately unconvincing.

3 Absence of Rights or Legitimate Interests

3.1 The Principle: Actori incumbit probatio

Pursuant to Paragraph 4(a)(ii) of the UDRP Rules[38], it is for the Complainant to demonstrate that the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name. WIPO Overview 3.0, section 2.1, usefully clarifies the evidentiary regime: the Complainant is not required to prove an absolute absence of legitimate interests, but only to establish a prima facie case[39]. In other words, the Complainant must submit a body of evidence sufficient to make it plausible that the Respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests. Once this threshold is reached, the burden of production shifts to the Respondent, who must then justify the registration and use of the domain name with concrete and verifiable evidence. It is within this balance that the entire philosophy of the UDRP lies: each party bears its burden, each must prove its case.

In this regard, Paragraph 4(c) of the UDRP Rules[40]sets out three (non-exhaustive) scenarios under which a Respondent may demonstrate rights or legitimate interests:

• First, bona fide use of the domain name prior to the dispute, or at least demonstrable preparations to do so;
• Second, being commonly known by the name contained in the domain name; and
• Third, legitimate non-commercial or fair use of the domain name, without intent to mislead consumers or to commercially exploit the goodwill of the Complainant’s mark.

In the present case, the Respondent based his defense primarily on the second scenario, claiming to be “commonly known” by the name reproduced in the domain name. This argument, frequently raised in UDRP proceedings, warrants close scrutiny of the criteria for establishing such recognition, as well as of the nature and probative value of the supporting evidence.

3.2 Proof of Rights or Legitimate Interests under Paragraph 4(c)(ii) of the UDRP

This provision refers to the defense that the Respondent is “commonly known” by the name contained in the disputed domain name. The demonstration requires objective, dated, and verifiable documentation. We shall recall the evidentiary standard and flexibility of means (3.2.1), then illustrate, through UDRP practice, the types of acceptable evidence in this regard (3.2.2). We will then apply this standard to the case at hand to highlight the absence of any proof of the surname “Alston” or any corresponding public use (3.2.3). Finally, we shall note an evidentiary initiative undertaken by the panel that was not submitted to adversarial debate (3.2.4).

3.2.1 Evidence by Any Means

Freedom of evidence, a fundamental principle of UDRP proceedings, means that there is no hierarchy or predetermined evidentiary value assigned to particular documents or types of proof. In essence, the panel may rely on any material it deems relevant. The applicable standard—common in adjudicative settings—is the balance of probabilities: the objective is not to establish absolute certainty, but rather to show that the alleged facts are more likely than not to be true. Within this framework, the value of a piece of evidence lies primarily in its ability to construct a coherent, plausible, and verifiable narrative. In other words, mere assertions carry little weight when compared to dated, verifiable documents produced at a time not tainted by suspicion. On this point, the WIPO Overview is unequivocal. Section 2.3 states that “conclusory statements are insufficient”: it is not enough to simply claim that one is “commonly known” by the disputed name—this must be proven[41].

3.2.2 Examples

There are few cases in which the respondent successfully convinces the panel that they are indeed commonly known by the disputed domain name. Such decisions typically rely on either an official identity document or well-documented professional use.

3.2.3 Assessment and evidentiary hierarchy

The analysis of these decisions reveals a hierarchy of evidence accepted by panels when a respondent claims to be “commonly known” by the name incorporated in the domain name. This is hardly surprising. Quite legitimately, panels tend to assign greater probative value to official documents (identity documents, company registers, commercial registry extracts) whose verifiable origin and pre-dispute date establish with certainty a link between the respondent and the sign in question. Added to this are commercial and professional documents (invoices, correspondence, contracts), which help demonstrate genuine, continuous, and bona fide use of the claimed name in an identifiable professional setting.

By contrast, self-declared elements, such as WHOIS data, online pseudonyms, or unilateral attestations, are consistently relegated to the status of mere indicia, insufficient on their own to establish any right or legitimate interest. Similarly, mere coincidence of surnames or accidental homonymy is not enough to prove prior rights or legitimate interest. Indeed, bearing the same name as the domain name does not confer legitimacy unless there is public and continuous use of the sign.

In this regard, the contrast between decisions D2024-2209 and D2024-1934 highlights the decisive role of evidence in assessing rights or legitimate interests based on surnames. In the former case, the production of a driver’s license confirming the name “Almirall,” combined with evidence of the domain name’s use for family email addresses, was sufficient to convince the panel of the respondent’s legitimacy[42]. Conversely, in the Soufflet case, the complete absence of any identity document or usage evidence led the panel to dismiss the argument of legitimacy based on the surname, despite the panel’s own proactive LinkedIn search suggesting the possible existence of a namesake[43]. This illustrates that, while a panel may complement missing information, it cannot compensate for the respondent’s lack of evidence. Only the production of authentic, prior, and verifiable documents can elevate a mere homonymy into a genuine right or legitimate interest.

In the Bartko case[44], the WHOIS registration data for the domain name <bartko.com> was deemed sufficient to establish a right or legitimate interest, even in the absence of a response from the respondent. This outcome may raise concerns, since—absent robust verification mechanisms by registries and registrars[45]—considering WHOIS data sufficient to establish such a right or interest amounts to assigning them questionable evidentiary weight[46]. However, it is worth noting that the outcome in Bartko was largely driven by the complainant’s failure to demonstrate an enforceable trademark right. Where, by contrast, a trademark right (and especially a well-known mark) is established, any match between WHOIS data and the respondent’s name merely constitutes a rebuttable presumption—one that must be supported by other factors (such as long-standing and consistent use, absence of bad faith, etc.). Lacking such support, and particularly in the face of a well-known mark that strengthens the presumption of prior knowledge, a defense based solely on a surname is likely to fail.

3.2.3 Lack of evidence as to the respondent’s identity

In UDRP proceedings, as in any judicial or quasi‑judicial process, mere assertions are not sufficient. Claims must be supported by dated and verifiable evidence. In the present case, concerning the domain name <alstomarketing.com>, the respondent produced none of the elements normally required to establish that he is “commonly known” by the name “Alston”: no identity document, no official record, no corporate document, no professional correspondence, and no evidence of prior public use of the sign. In short, nothing. Accordingly, on the face of the decision itself, there is no proof of a surname “Alston” within the meaning of paragraph 4(c)(ii) of the UDRP.

Moreover, even assuming that an identity document bearing the name “Alston” had been produced, it would still have been necessary to demonstrate effective public use of that surname. In any event, the obvious difference between “Alston” and “Alstom” would, by itself, have been sufficient to undermine the argument. The defense based on a patronymic claim should therefore not have succeeded.

Furthermore, since <alstonmarketing.com> was unavailable, a number of coherent and reasonable alternatives existed at the time of registration of the disputed domain name: <alston.marketing> (arguably the most natural choice), <alston.online>, <alston.pro>, <alston.services>, <alston.business>, <alston.company>, <alston.studio>[47], and others, all of which were available at the relevant time. Why, if one is indeed called Alston, choose “alsto” or “alstom” rather than “alston”? The respondent’s argument that the choice of <alstomarketing.com> was dictated by the unavailability of <alstonmarketing.com> does not withstand scrutiny.

It should also be noted that, on a QWERTY keyboard, the letters “N” and “M” are adjacent, making the substitution between “alston” and “alstom” all the more plausible from a typosquatting perspective.

Finally, even if one were to accept, purely for the sake of argument, the respondent’s patronymic explanation, there is no evidence of any serious preparatory steps toward an actual business activity: no website under development, no visual identity, no reservation of professional accounts or profiles, no invoices, and no corporate documentation. In short, there is no evidence whatsoever of any activity, several years after the registration of the disputed domain name. If the respondent had genuinely intended to launch a marketing venture, one would reasonably expect: (i) at least a minimum of lexical or strategic creativity in the choice of the domain name; (ii) basic diligence with respect to the existence of prior trademark rights; and (iii) some commencement of performance. An inspired entrepreneur does not abandon a project for five years. He develops it, protects it, and gives it substance. Here, there was neither originality, nor diligence, nor execution.

In sum, no evidence links the respondent to the name “Alston,” nor does any evidence justify the choice of the sign “alstom.” The combination of an empty evidentiary record, an incoherent explanation, and the absence of any genuine activity should have led the panel to reject any claim of rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name.

4 An Evidentiary Initiative Outside the Adversarial Process

Faced with an evidentiary void, the panel attempted to fill the Respondent’s gaps by breaking down the disputed sign as “alsto marketing,” by postulating “alstom arketing” (where “arketing” is clearly meaningless), or by interpreting it as a simple misspelling of “alstom marketing.” Yet on the one hand, the “alstom arketing” hypothesis is highly fragile—both linguistically and intellectually. On the other hand, siding with the Respondent when he claims to have registered <alstomarketing.com> “on the basis of his surname”[48] only reinforces ambiguity: “Alstom” does not appear on his civil documents, and there is no evidence that “Alston” is indeed his surname. Finally, to assert that a cybersquatter would have “logically”[49] chosen <alstomarketing.com> simply because the domain was available reflects neither existing case law nor observed practices: typosquatting aims to capture traffic through confusion, conceal targeting, and sometimes delay the trademark owner’s reaction. Conversely, if the intent had truly been based on a surname, numerous alternative options consistent with “Alston” (e.g. <alston.marketing>, <alston.services>, <alston.business>, etc.) were available at the time of registration. In short, this supplementary reasoning cannot replace the evidence the Respondent failed to produce.

The panel thus took the initiative, ex officio, to conduct a domain name search—without informing the Parties or allowing for rebuttal[50]. Yet when such checks are likely to influence the assessment of bad faith, procedural fairness demands an adversarial discussion. In this case, the adversarial process should have prevailed over procedural expediency. Moreover, the initiative is all the more unfortunate because it was not balanced by a similar curiosity regarding the fame of the ALSTOM trademark. This was left as a “poorly supported”[51] claim, even though it could have been verified almost instantly via publicly accessible sources available to any trademark and domain name specialist. In other words, an external element favorable to the Respondent was taken into account without debate, while no corresponding verification was made in favor of the Complainant on the equally central question of bad faith.

UDRP practice reveals an inconsistency in how panels exercise their fact-finding powers. In case D2001-1399 concerning <miba.com>, the panel formally directed[52] the Respondent to produce a birth certificate or equivalent documentation, and then rejected the evidence due to lack of translation and authenticity guarantees, ultimately concluding that the Respondent had no rights or legitimate interests[53]. In contrast, in decision D2025-0949, the panel did not require any proof of identity to support the Respondent’s claim to the surname “Alston.” This divergence reflects two approaches: one based on verifiable evidence, and another that limits itself to the existing record while leaving unsubstantiated assertions untouched. In surname-based disputes, the former is more consistent with the reversal of the burden of proof[54].

5 Conclusion

At the end of the analysis, one is tempted to conclude that decision D2025-0949 asserts more than it proves. The impression is that of an unbalanced case. On the Complainant’s side, the panel held that the fame of the ALSTOM trademark (which can easily be documented in France, the UK, the US or elsewhere) was not sufficiently evidenced within the narrow framework of UDRP proceedings. On the Respondent’s side, no tangible evidence supports the surname argument. In between, the panel relied on an ex officio verification that was not submitted to the Parties for comment, a verification that benefited the Respondent, while failing to exercise comparable diligence to assess the fame of ALSTOM.

At the very least, it seems highly unlikely that the Respondent was unaware of the ALSTOM trademark, whose international visibility is well-known. Furthermore, no document establishes that the Respondent is indeed named Alston. And even if that were the case, such a surname would not confer any rights or legitimate interests in the name “Alstom,” especially since the registration of <alstomarketing.com> clearly demonstrates a will to operate in the shadow of the brand.

The lesson is twofold: fame is only as good as the evidence that supports it, and alternative hypotheses are only as strong as the proof that sustains them. In UDRP cases, it is the simple, dated, and verifiable pieces of evidence that carry the day. And in the present case, one may simply conclude that—sometimes—little is still better than nothing.

6 Notes

[1] Data verified via Archive.com and Viewdns.info/iphistory [20 October 2025].

[2] Alstom designs, manufactures and maintains rail mobility solutions: rolling stock (high-speed trains, suburban trains, metros, trams), locomotives and EMUs; signalling systems and equipment; turnkey solutions (infrastructure, energy, depots); maintenance and modernization services, fleet and parts management; alternative propulsion technologies (battery, hydrogen).

[3] Known as the “UDRP” for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy.

[4] WIPO Case D2025-0949, Alstom v. Farris Alston, April 22, 2025, <alstomarketing.com>..

[5] On “UDRP-like” procedures: in addition to the ICANN UDRP applicable to gTLDs (and to many ccTLDs that have adopted it), several similar regimes exist: URS (Uniform Rapid Suspension) for new gTLDs; auDRP (.au); CIRA DRP (.ca); inDRP (.in); CNNIC cnDRP (.cn and Chinese character TLDs operated by CNNIC, including .中国); euADR (.eu); Nominet DRS (.uk); SYRELI and PARL EXPERT (.fr, AFNIC); SWITCH (.ch/.li). All aim to combat cybersquatting via expedited written procedures, though they vary in criteria, burden of proof, appeals, and remedies (usually transfer or suspension of the disputed domain name).

[6] The same analysis applies to any domain name dispute resolution system inspired by the UDRP.

[7] Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, 20 March 1883 (wipo.int).

[8] This provision was introduced during the Hague Revision (1925) of the Paris Convention.

[9] For editorial simplicity, we will use the adjective “well-known.”

[10] Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Selected UDRP Questions, Third Edition (WIPO Jurisprudential Overview 3.0) (wipo.int).

[11] Para. 1.3 of WIPO Jurisprudential Overview 3.0 (wipo.int): although focused on unregistered trademarks, this paragraph provides a transferrable evidentiary framework applicable to the UDRP when assessing brand recognition: duration and nature of use, sales volumes, advertising investment, recognition by the public, industry, and media, surveys, and where relevant, online presence and targeting by third parties.

[12] Para. 3.1 of WIPO Jurisprudential Overview 3.0 (wipo.int): this paragraph explains that the Respondent’s actual or imputed knowledge of the mark, and the “targeting” of the Complainant, are classic indicators of bad faith registration and use. Fame plays a probative role here, supporting the presumption that the Respondent could not have been unaware of the mark, especially in cases involving exact reproduction or opportunistic bad faith.

[13] Business to Business.

[14] Business to Government.

[15] Business to Consumers.

[16] WIPO Jurisprudential Overview 3.0 (wipo.int).

[17] Rules for the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”) (icann.org).

[18] “The maximum word count for paragraph 3(b)(ix) of the Rules is 5000” (Art. 11(a), WIPO Supplemental Rules) and “The maximum word count for paragraph 5(c)(i) of the Rules is 5000” (Art. 11(b), same). See Article 11 of the WIPO Supplemental Rules for the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (wipo.int).

[19] “Alstom in the UK and Ireland,” Alstom.com [last accessed 20 October 2025].

[20] See e.g., “Alstom completes the UK’s biggest fleet upgrade as final refurbished Pendolino returns to service,” Alstom.com, 25 June 2024.

[21] FT.com [search performed on 20 October 2025].

[22] Search conducted on 20 October 2025.

[23] Search conducted on 20 October 2025.

[24] In October 2025, the New York Times referenced Alstom over 500 times. Notably, the “Alstom–General Electric deal” (2014–2015), which received major transatlantic coverage, concerned the sale of Alstom’s energy business to GE. See e.g., “GE Completes Alstom Power Acquisition,” wsj.com, 2 November 2015.

[25] Results based on a search conducted on 20 October 2025.

[26] WIPO Case D2020-0488, Alstom and Bombardier Inc. (trading as Bombardier Aerospace) v. Patrick Anfossi, 5 April 2020. In that case, the panel found that the Respondent could not have been unaware of the Complainants’ earlier trademarks when registering the disputed domain names—something the Respondent did not dispute—particularly as the linked websites included hyperlinks to press articles referencing the Complainants.

[27] In WIPO Case D2009-1702, Alstom v. Industrial Tests, Inc., 6 February 2010, the panel applied the Oki Data precedent (WIPO Case D2001-0903, Oki Data Americas, Inc. v. ASD, Inc., 6 November 2001) and recognized a legitimate interest for <alstomservice.com>, used descriptively and transparently by an independent service provider for ALSTOM equipment. The complaint was therefore denied for this single domain, while the other eleven were transferred.

[28] On burden-shifting, see below.

[29] Article 15(a) of the UDRP Rules: “The panel shall decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted and in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable” (Rules for the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (icann.org)).

[30] Under which the Complainant must prove that the domain name was registered and is being used in bad faith (Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy: icann.org).

[31] Article 10(b) of the UDRP Rules: “In all cases, the Panel shall ensure that the Parties are treated with equality and that each Party is given a fair opportunity to present its case” (Rules: icann.org).

[32] Supra.

[33] Article 22 of the WIPO Supplemental Rules for UDRP (“Exclusion of Liability”) provides that except in cases of willful misconduct, neither the Center nor the panel shall be liable for any act or omission in connection with the proceeding. “Willful misconduct” means intentional behavior or conscious disregard for the UDRP Principles or Rules (e.g., concealed conflicts of interest, refusal to allow party rebuttal, or willful distortion of key facts). In contrast, analytical omissions, judgment errors, or lack of reasoning are considered negligence and covered by the liability waiver clause.

[34] “little evidence showing that the ALSTOM mark is well-known as it claims”.

[35] Under Article 4(c) of the UDRP Policy “Rights or Legitimate Interests,” three non-exhaustive scenarios allow the Respondent to demonstrate a right or legitimate interest: (i) before notice of the dispute, use or demonstrable preparations to use the domain name in good faith to offer goods or services; (ii) being commonly known by the domain name, even without a trademark; or (iii) making a legitimate non-commercial or fair use without intent for commercial gain or to tarnish the Complainant’s mark.

[36] WIPO Case D2000-0003, Telstra Corporation Limited v. Nuclear Marshmallows, 18 February 2000.

[37] WIPO Case D2000-0596, Gordon Sumner p/k/a Sting v. Michael Urvan, July 24, 2000, <sting.com>.

[38] Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (icann.org).

[39] Section 2.1, WIPO Jurisprudential Overview 3.0 (wipo.int).

[40] Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (icann.org).

[41] Section 2.3, WIPO Jurisprudential Overview 3.0 (wipo.int).

[42] WIPO Case D2024-2209, Almirall, S.A. v. Jorge Almirall, Design Help, Inc., <almirall.org>, July 15, 2024.

[43] WIPO Case D2024-1934, Établissements J. Soufflet v. Francois SOUFLET, July 22, 2024.

[44] WIPO Case D2022-0043, Bartko Zankel Bunzel & Miller v. Perfect Privacy, LLC / Jan Bartko, March 17, 2022.

[45] Some ccTLDs perform ID or eligibility verification during registration, but such cases remain exceptions.

[46] The domain name system follows a liberal model of registration without prior authorization or ID checks. Exceptions apply only to regulated namespaces (some ccTLDs or sector-restricted gTLDs like .BANK, .LAW, .PHARMA).

[47] Data verified with Archive.com and Viewdns.info/iphistory [20 October 2025].

[48] “Respondent claims he registered ‘Alstomarketing’ based on his surname” (WIPO Case D2025-0949, Alstom v. Farris Alston, April 22, 2025, <alstomarketing.com>).

[49] “It would seem illogical to register a typo version of ‘alstom marketing’, when the more relevant (and potentially valuable) domain name <alstommarketing.com> was available” (WIPO Case D2025-0949, Alstom v. Farris Alston, April 22, 2025, <alstomarketing.com>).

[50] This is contrary to Articles 10(b) and 15(a) of the UDRP Rules, which respectively require that “In all cases, the Panel shall ensure that the Parties are treated with equality and that each Party is given a fair opportunity to present its case,” and “The panel shall decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted and in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable” (UDRP Rules: icann.org).

[51] “Complainant has provided little evidence showing that the ALSTOM mark is well-known as it claims” (WIPO Case D2025-0949, Alstom v. Farris Alston, April 22, 2025, <alstomarketing.com>).

[52] Under Article 12 of the UDRP Rules: “In addition to the complaint and the response, the Panel may request, in its sole discretion, further statements or documents from either of the Parties” (Rules: icann.org).

[53] WIPO Case D2001-1399, Miba Gleitlager Aktiengesellschaft v. Vishnu Prasad Miba, February 19, 2002.

[54] See supra.