The decision issued on 13 October 2025 in GROUPE ADEO / LEROY MERLIN v. Traffic Jet concerning the domain name <leroymerlin.live> raises legitimate concerns. Although the first two UDRP elements were clearly established and the Respondent failed to file any response, the Panel rejected the complaint on the grounds that the passive holding lasted “only” seven days, a duration deemed insufficient to demonstrate bad faith.
This excessively formalistic interpretation leads to a paradoxical result: a cybersquatter could systematically escape a finding of bad faith during a short window of a few days, regardless of the notoriety of the trademark, even when offering no legitimate explanation and refusing to participate in the proceedings.
Key Facts
The domain name <leroymerlin.live>, registered on 3 October 2025, reproduces in full the highly distinctive and well-known LEROY MERLIN trademark, protected through multiple international and EU registrations. At the time the complaint was filed, on 10 October 2025, the domain name resolved to no content.
The registrant, Traffic Jet, did not respond. The Panel accepted without difficulty that the first two UDRP conditions—identity/confusing similarity and lack of rights or legitimate interests—were satisfied.
The Sticking Point: Bad Faith and the “Shortness” of the Passive Holding
The Panel acknowledged that the mark is famous, that the Respondent has no rights, and that it provided no explanation for the registration. Nevertheless, it refused to infer bad faith solely because the inactivity lasted only one week.
This approach is problematic for several reasons.
1. Bad faith cannot be reduced to the duration of inactivity
Passive holding is never an isolated criterion. As established in the Telstra jurisprudence, it must be assessed in its overall context. The Respondent’s inaction is just one factor among several:
the exceptional notoriety of the mark,
the exact identity between mark and domain name,
the complete absence of a response,
the lack of any plausible good-faith use,
the choice of a .live extension often used for promotional or ephemeral purposes.
Duration is merely one element of the analysis, not a threshold requirement.
2. No conceivable good-faith use existed
The Panel acknowledges that the mark is “widely known.”
In such circumstances, numerous UDRP decisions hold that the burden shifts to the respondent to provide a credible explanation.
Given the lack of a response and the extreme distinctiveness of “LEROY MERLIN,” the only reasonable conclusion is that the Respondent knew of the mark and targeted it.
3. The Panel’s reasoning creates a dangerous precedent
According to the logic of the decision, a respondent could now:
keep a domain inactive for a few days,
ignore the proceedings,
and wait for the complaint to be dismissed for lack of evidence of “sustained” bad faith.
Such a reasoning dangerously tilts the UDRP balance in favour of cybersquatters.
4. Subsequent facts confirm the risk: the domain is now used for a fraudulent website
The domain now resolves to a fraudulent website selling DEWALT tools. This development clearly indicates that bad faith existed from the outset, making the Panel’s refusal even more questionable.
An Isolated and Difficult-to-Justify Decision
The decision attempts to distinguish Telstra and Toeppen on the basis of the duration of inactivity. Yet neither decision requires a minimum period before bad faith can be found.
The reasoning creates an artificial threshold that has no basis in the UDRP.
Most Panels adopt a pragmatic approach: when a mark is well-known, the domain is identical, and no good-faith use is plausible, even very short passive holding is sufficient.
This decision therefore appears to be an outlier, standing apart from the overwhelmingly consistent jurisprudence.
Conclusion: A Barely Comprehensible Rejection, But Not a Final One
The Panel rejected the complaint while acknowledging that the complainant may file again once active use or prolonged inactivity emerges.
This admission reveals the paradox at the heart of the decision: the Panel itself describes the conditions under which a new complaint would succeed—conditions that were, in substance, already present.
The subsequent fraudulent use of the domain name merely confirms that the original approach was flawed.
A second complaint should logically result in the transfer of the domain name.