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ICANN Rejects Ukraine’s Request to Disable Russia’s ccTLDs

Photo 41727720 / Ukraine © Fedir Shulenok | Dreamstime.com

.UA Hostmaster, the registry in charge of the management of Ukrainian .UA domain names, published several messages to report on the security measures it has taken to ensure the continuity of its services. For instance, the .UA registry moved its servers to the European Union (EU) (hostmaster.ua, 2022-02-26). In addition, it has enabled Cloudflare DNS firewall protection for com.ua, kiev.ua, and some strategic .UA domains such as GOV.UA (hostmaster.ua, 2022-02-25).

In the hope of countering the Russian propaganda, Mykhailo Fedorov (Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Digital Transformation of Ukraine) and Andrii Nabok (Representative of Ukraine on the Governmental Advisory Committee of ICANN) formally asked Göran Marby (president of ICANN, “Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers”) to disconnect the Russian ccTLDs (“.ru”, “.рф” and even “.su” which was intended to designate the Soviet Union) (letter from Mr. Fedorov to Mr. Marby dated February 28, 2022: icann.org). However, neither the ICANN Bylaws nor the Russian ccTLD Delegation Agreement provides for such a sanction. Moreover, disconnecting the ccTLDs of Russia would run counter to ICANN’s raison d’être: to ensure the interoperability, security, and stability of the Domain Name System. In addition, it is probably worth recalling that ICANN is not a United Nations body, unlike, for example, the World Intellectual Property Organization or the International Telecommunications Union. In response, ICANN President Göran Marby recalled that “ICANN’s primary role (…) is to ensure the consistent and unique assignment of Internet identifiers in line with global policies” (letter from Mr. Marby to Mr. Fedorov dated March 2, 2022: icann.org). In other words, ICANN does not have the unilateral power to disconnect a ccTLD. In this regard, the ICANN President adds that “[s]uch a change in the process would have devastating and permanent effects on the trust and utility of this global system” (ibid.). Moreover, consenting to Ukraine’s request would fatally encourage sanctioned countries to adopt alternative systems, which would amount to permanently sacrificing the uniqueness and interoperability of the Internet. This is what Mr. Marby means when writing: “[t]o make unilateral changes would erode trust in the multistakeholder model and the policies designed to sustain global Internet interoperability” (ibid.). Finally, Mr. Marby recalled that ICANN has no power of action over the content of the Internet.

This unique context pushed ICANN to allocate emergency financial support for continued access to the Internet:

The ICANN Board has directed ICANN President and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Göran Marby to develop a process and disperse financial assistance to support the security, stability, and resiliency of the Internet’s unique identifier systems, specifically to support mitigation measures where access to the Internet infrastructure is jeopardized by sudden, unexpected events beyond the control of the affected users. The ICANN Board expects that the distribution directed today will focus on support for maintaining Internet access for users within Ukraine.

The Board also recognizes the value of providing this type of support on a longer-term basis and has directed the CEO to evaluate whether and how to instill this effort for future budget years.

Botterman further explained the Board’s rationale for its decision, “ICANN stands for a single, global, and interoperable Internet that serves all people around the world in exercising their fundamental human rights, including the human right to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas. It is through unimpeded access to the Internet and the free flow of information that people can gain knowledge and exposure to a diversity of viewpoints and information. This is especially critical when timely access to information and communication may be life-saving.” (icann.org, 2022-03-06).

In contrast, major content generation platforms have adopted appropriate and effective measures to quash Russian state media (especially RT and Sputnik), including Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, TikTok, Google News, Microsoft, YouTube in Europe, and elsewhere.